

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2416

S E C R E T MOSCOW 10144

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US,UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF 16TH PLENARY MEETING,
JULY 21 TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO. 71

1. SUMMARY: BEZUMOV STATEMENT PRESENTED DESCRIPTION OF SOVIET ALTERNATIVE TO SLIFER FOR MEASURING POSITION OF SHOCK WAVE VS TIME. INSTRUMENT TERMED QUOTE DISCRETE UNQUOTE, BASED ON SET OF CONTACT SENSORS EITHER IN EMPLACEMENT HOLE OR IN SPECIAL NEARBY INSTRUMENT HOLE. IN DISCUSSION FOLLOWING STATEMENT MOROKHOV EMPHASIZED THAT SOVIETS COULD NOT ACCEPT FOREIGN INSTRUMENTS IN EMPLACEMENT HOLE. THIS WOULD BE CASE, HE EMPHASIZED, REGARDLESS OF METHOD OR IMPLEMENTING APPROACH THAT MIGHT BE FOLLOWED. SOVIET POSITION IS CATEGORIC. END SUMMARY

2. MOROKHOV INTRODUCED SOVIET STATEMENT ADDING COMMENT THAT MOST EXACT METHOD SHOULD BE USED TO DISTINGUISH INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS WITHIN A GROUP. BEZUMOV READ SOVIET STATEMENT DESCRIBING METHOD FOR DETERMINING YIELD OF EXPLOSIONS BASED ON MEASURING POSITION OF SHOCK WAVE AT DISCRETE POSITION VS TIME IN HYDRODYNAMIC ZONE. DISCRETE METHOD IS BASED ON SHORTCIRCUITING CONTACT SENSORS PLACED ON A ROD AT STRICTLY FIXED INTERVALS, THE LOWER END OF WHICH WOULD BE CONNECTED BY A FLANGE TO TOP OF EXPLOSIVE CANNISTER, SAME METHOD

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COULD BE USED IN A NEARBY SEPARATE INSTRUMENT HOLE.

3. FURTHER DESCRIPTION LISTED FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
MEASUREMENT SENSORS, SHIELDED MULTICHANNEL CABLE, INSTRUMENT
TO FORM SIGNALS, CABLE TO RECORDER AND RECORDING INSTRUMENT.

4. IN DESCRIBING OPERATION, BEZUMOV SAID ELECTRICAL POWER
CAN BE SUPPLIED EITHER DOWN-HOLE OR FROM SURFACE.
TRANSMISSION OF DATA FROM POINT WHERE SIGNALS FORMED TO
RECORDER CAN BE BY CABLE OR BY RADIO. CABLE HAS NOT
ELECTRICAL CONNECTION WITH OTHER SYSTEMS IN EMPLACEMENT HOLE
AND CONSEQUENTLY NO INFLUENCE ON FUNCTION OF EXPLOSION.

5. BEZUMOV STATED ACCURACY OF THIS METHOD, BASED ON
MULTIPLE USE, IS NO WORSE THAN 1.3. SAME INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS APPLY AS FOR SLIFER TO INSURE PROPER DISTANCE
FROM EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. SOVIET SIDE CONCLUDES, THEREFORE,
THAT EITHER SLIFER OR DISCRETE METHOD IS PRACTICAL FOR
DETERMINATION OF YIELD BY MEASUREMENT OF SHOCK WAVE VS TIME.

6. AT BLACKBOARD BEZUMOV DREW DIAGRAM OF METHOD. INDICATED
PLACEMENT OF SENSORS IN EXPLOSIVE EMPLACEMENT HOLE IS
PREFERABLE. NUMBER OF SENSORS WOULD BE ABOUT TWENTY.
MEASURED SIGNAL IS VOLTAGE CHANGE AS EACH SENSOR SHORTED OUT.

7. IN DISCUSSION AT TABLE, WHILE EXPERTS WERE REVIEWING
SOVIET "DISCRETE" METHOD AT BLACKBOARD TO ENSURE IT WAS
UNDERSTOOD, MOROKHOV RAISED POINT OF CONCERN WHICH CLEARLY
AT HEART OF SOVIET VIEW. NAMELY, CONCERNS (WHICH MOROKHOV
MADE CLEAR ARE CATEGORIC ON PART OF SOVIETS, AND CANNOT BE
OVERCOME REGARDLESS OF IMPLEMENTING METHOD FOLLOWED) ABOUT:
(A) POSSIBILITY OF VERIFYING SIDE GAINING ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION (FOR EXAMPLE, FIRING SIGNALS) BEYOND THAT NEEDED
FOR YIELD VERIFICATION, AND (B) EQUIPMENT BROUGHT IN BY
VERIFYING SIDE BEING PUT DOWN EMPLACEMENT HOLE WITH EXPLOSIVE
DEVICE.

8. MOROKHOV ARGUED THAT VERIFYING SIDE SHOULD USE MEASURE-
MENTS MADE WITH HOST COUNTRY INSTRUMENTS ON HOST COUNTRY
TERRITORY. THUS, USSR WOULD RELY ON US SLIFER INSTRUMENTS
IN US, OBTAINING INFORMATION PRODUCED BY THAT SYSTEM;

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US, ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD RELY ON SOVIET INSTRUMENTATION
IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OBTAIN INFORMATION PRODUCED BY
THAT SYSTEM. MOROKHOV ARGUED THAT THIS WOULD MAKE EVERYTHING
SIMPLE; WHEREAS, IF VERIFYING SIDE SUPPLIES THE EQUIPMENT,
THERE WILL BE A LOT OF INCONVENIENCE AND EXPENSE BRINGING
IT TO THE SITE. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN LENGTHY
CHECKING BY HOST SIDE (AFTER WHICH THE EQUIPMENT MIGHT NOT
WORK ANYMORE). EVEN IF ALL THAT IS DONE, "OUTSIDE"

PEOPLE WOULD NEVER BE CONVINCED THAT UNAUTHORIZED INFORMATION WOULD NOT BE OBTAINED. ALSO PROJECT DIRECTORS GET VERY UPSET IF SOME STRANGE EQUIPMENT IS PUT IN THEIR EMPLACEMENT HOLE.

9. MOROKHOV STATED THAT NO APPROACH OTHER THAN ONE HE OUTLINED WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO SOMIETS, BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO NONVINCE THOSE IN USSR WHO HAD TO BE CONVINCED THAT US (IF US SLIFER EQUIPMENT IS USED) WOULD NOT BE GETTING INFORMATION BEYOND THAT REQUIRED FOR VERIFICATION. BUCHHEIM SAID IN REPLY THAT CONSIDERATIONS RAISED BY MOROKHOV HAD BEEN EXAMINED BY US; AND CONCLUSION WAS TO PROPOSE SLIFER APPROACH AND IMPLEMENTING METHOD WE HAD SET FORTH. HE ALSO SAID THAT MOST OF SAME CONCERNS, INCLUDING THAT OF CONVINCING OTHERS, WERE ALSO INVOLVED FOR US IN SOVIET APPROACH, I.E., NEED TO ASSURE VERIFYING SIDE OF SOUNDNESS OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED. IT WAS AGREED QUESTION IS COMPLEX AND IMPORTANT, AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER; BUT MOROKHOV WAS NOT PREPARED TO HAVE EXPERTS ADDRESS IT. HE SAID THERE IS NOTHING FOR THEM TO DISCUSS. EVEN IF EXPERTS AGREED THAT NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WOULD BE ACQUIRED, THIS WOULD BE USELESS BECAUSE IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVINCE OTHERS.

10. REF STATE 170831, NORDYKE AUTHORIZED TO RETURN HOME. DEPARTED MOSCOW PANAM 45 JULY 19. WILL PROVIDE RECOMMENDATION LATER WHETHER NORDYKE SHOULD RETURN AUGUST 12 OR BE REPLACED SOONER.

11. AS PER REQUEST STATE 170365 PARA 9, FULL TEXT OF SUBPARA (16) OF PARA IV OF MOSCOW 9830 IS AS FOLLOWS:

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BEGIN TEXT (16) OBSERVERS MUST HAVE RIGHT TO SELECT AND COLLECT AN AGREED MINIMUM NUMBER OF MELT SAMPLES FROM SITE OF EACH INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSION TO WHICH FISSION-YIELD LIMIT IS APPLICABLE (BUT SEE NOTE 2, BELOW).
END TEXT

12. AS PER REQUEST STATE 170365 PARA 10, MOSCOW 9957 HAS BEEN RETRANSMITTED.
STOESSEL

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NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
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Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
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Disposition History: n/a
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